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The Equity-Financing Channel, the Catering Channel, 
and Corporate Investment: International Evidence 
 
Abstract 
We examine how stock market mispricing affects corporate investment in an international 
setting. We find that investment is more sensitive to stock prices for equity-dependent firms than 
for non-equity-dependent firms in our international sample. Investment is also more sensitive to 
stock prices for firms located in countries with more developed capital markets (i.e., lower costs 
of raising capital), higher share turnover (i.e., shorter shareholder horizons), and higher R&D 
intensity (i.e., more opaque assets). More importantly, the positive relation between equity 
dependence and the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is more pronounced for firms 
located in these same countries. These findings are consistent with the equity-financing 
hypothesis and the catering hypothesis on corporate investment proposed by Baker, Stein, and 
Wurgler (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009), respectively.  
 
JEL classifications: G32; G34 
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The existing literature has documented ample evidence of a positive relation between 
corporate investment and stock prices. The traditional explanation for this observed positive 
association is the “q-theory of investment” (Tobin (1969)). In an efficient market, stock prices 
(measured by Tobin’s Q) reflect the market’s information about a firm’s investment 
opportunities or its marginal rate of return on capital. However, studies in behavioral finance 
have offered alternative explanations. For example, Keynes (1936) points out that stock market 
mispricing has an effect on the cost of equity, while Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and others 
argue that mispricing can also affect the cost of debt through its effect on perceived collateral 
values. Since the non-fundamental component of stock prices causes the effective cost of 
external equity to deviate from the cost of other forms of capital, this divergence affects a firm’s 
equity financing and, consequently, corporate investment.  
Based on Stein (1996), Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) derive and test a simple model that 
suggests that corporate investment is more sensitive to stock prices for equity-dependent firms 
than for non-equity-dependent firms. The intuition is that managers of equity-dependent firms 
have incentives to issue equity in more attractive terms to finance investment when their stock 
prices are overvalued; but they would rather forgo their investment opportunities when their 
stock prices are undervalued. Using a modified KZ index first constructed by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) as a measure of equity dependence, Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) find 
support for the equity-financing channel argument for U.S. firms.  
Also based on Stein (1996), Polk and Sapienza (2009) develop and test a catering theory of 
investment, through which stock market mispricing affects corporate investment decisions. 
Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for mispricing, their empirical results from U.S. firms are 
consistent with the predictions of the catering theory--overvalued firms invest more while 
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undervalued firms invest less. In addition, this catering effect is more pronounced for firms with 
shorter shareholder horizons (proxied by higher share turnover) and longer expected durations of 
mispricing (proxied by higher R&D intensity). 
Despite these findings, very little is known about the relation between the roles of the 
equity-financing channel and the catering channel in corporate investment outside the United 
States, and in particular in emerging markets. Our first objective is therefore to examine whether 
the results documented by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) on the role of the equity-financing 
channel in corporate investment can be extended to our international sample. The equity-
financing hypothesis predicts that the degree of equity dependence is positively related to the 
effect of stock prices on corporate investment. In this study, we focus on the effect of the equity-
financing channel on corporate investment at the firm level. 
Our second objective is to test whether the catering theory of Polk and Sapienza (2009) can 
also be extended to the international markets. More specifically, we extend the theory to allow 
for the cross-country difference in the cost of raising external equity capital. This extended 
catering theory suggests that corporate investment is more sensitive to stock prices for firms 
located in countries with a lower cost of raising external equity capital. The original catering 
theory of Polk and Sapienza (2009) also predicts that corporate investment is more sensitive to 
stock prices for firms whose shareholders have shorter horizons and whose assets are more 
difficult to value. In this study, we focus on the effects of the catering channel on corporate 
investment at the country level. 
Our third and final objective considers the joint effects of the equity-financing and catering 
channels on the relation between corporate investment and stock prices. Specifically, we expect 
the positive relation between firm-level equity dependence and the sensitivity of investment to 
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stock prices to be stronger for firms located in countries with lower financing costs and more 
short-term investors, as well as for firms whose assets are more difficult to evaluate. 
To test our hypotheses, we use the financial flexibility index as an inverse measure of firm-
level equity dependence. Our first main result confirms the role of the equity-financing channel 
in corporate investment decisions in the broader cross-country sample. More specifically, the 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices monotonically increases with the degree of equity 
dependence. We recognize that there may be alternative explanations for our result and potential 
measurement problems concerning several of our explanatory variables in the regressions. We 
attempt to address these concerns by performing a series of robustness tests. Our result survives 
these robustness tests.  
To test the catering theory, we use the extent of capital market development to measure the 
cost of raising external capital. Capital market development is measured at the country level by: 
(1) the ease of access to equity markets, (2) whether the market is developed or emerging, and (3) 
the level of legal protection afforded to investors. In addition, we use country-level share 
turnover and R&D intensity to measure average shareholder horizon and the opaqueness of 
average firm assets, respectively. Consistent with the predictions of the extended catering theory, 
we find that corporate investment is more sensitive to stock prices for firms located in countries 
with more developed capital markets, higher share turnover, and higher R&D intensity. More 
importantly, the role of the equity-financing channel in the sensitivity of investment to stock 
prices is more pronounced for firms located in these same countries. These results suggest that 
both the equity-financing and catering channels affect the effect of stock market mispricing on 
corporate investment decisions.  
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The studies that are closest to ours are the ones by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and 
Polk and Sapienza (2009). Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and Polk and Sapienza (2009) 
emphasize solely the roles of equity dependence and the catering channel, respectively, at the 
firm level. By contrast, our international sample allows us to focus on the roles of firm-level 
equity dependence and country-level institutions or characteristics as well as their joint effects. 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous empirical study has attempted to examine these issues 
jointly. 
The findings from our study also complement the literature on the effect of stock prices on 
corporate investment. Earlier studies by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and Blanchard, 
Rhee, and Summers (1993) find little evidence that the stock market affects corporate investment. 
However, the evidence from recent studies by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Chen, Goldstein, 
and Jiang (2007), Polk and Sapienza (2009), and Ovtchinnikov and McConnell (2009) suggests 
otherwise. The evidence from our international sample further confirms that financial markets 
are not just a sideshow; they also affect corporate investment decisions.
1
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops our hypotheses. 
Section 2 describes the sources of our data. Section 3 presents the test results about the role of 
the equity-financing channel in corporate investment. Section 4 presents the test results about the 
role of the catering channel. Section 5 reports the results about joint effects of the two channels. 
Section 6 discusses the q-theory with investment frictions as an alternative explanation for some 
of our results. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
1. Hypothesis Development 
                                                          
1
 See also Chirinko and Schaller (2001) and Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Hubberman (2005). Another line of 
research examines the relation between capital investment and subsequent stock returns. See, for example, Titman, 
Wei, and Xie (2004), and Li and Lu (2010). 
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1.1 The role of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment 
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) extend the model of Stein (1996) and derive the 
implications of stock market mispricing for the role of the equity-financing channel in corporate 
investment. They define a firm as equity dependent if its stock price is undervalued and its 
available capital is so low that it has to issue undervalued equity to achieve the first-best level of 
investment. They argue that stock market irrationality is unlikely to affect the investment 
decisions of non-equity-dependent firms (those with sufficient liquidity and no debt), since they 
do not rely on external financing. By contrast, equity-dependent firms will not want to issue 
equity in the external market when their stocks are undervalued, even if they need to raise funds 
for investment. The opposite is true in the case of overvaluation--equity-dependent firms are 
willing to issue equity to finance their investment when their stocks are overvalued. Therefore, 
equity-dependent firms have their investments that are more sensitive to the variation in the non-
fundamental component of stock prices than non-equity-dependent firms.  
Our first hypothesis on the role of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment 
follows that of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003). Specifically, we hypothesize that: 
H1:  Under the equity-financing channel, investment is more sensitive to stock prices for equity-
dependent firms than for non-equity dependent firms in our international sample. 
 
1.2 The role of the catering channel in corporate investment 
Polk and Sapienza (2009) extend the model of Stein (1996) and derive the testable 
implications of stock market mispricing for the role of the catering channel in corporate 
investment.  We further extend their model to an international setting by allowing for the cross-
country difference in the cost of raising capital. Following Polk and Sapienza (2009) closely with 
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the same notations, we assume that K is the capital at time 0 used by a firm to produce output 
and K0 is the initial capital right before time 0. The new investment, (K – K0), has a unit cost of c, 
if there is no market frictions. With market frictions, the cost of capital is c(1 + f), where f > 0, 
and can be interpreted as a measure of how difficult and costly it is for a firm to raise external 
capital. Therefore, f should be lower for firms located in more developed capital markets or in 
countries with easier access to equity markets or stronger legal protection.  
Due to investor irrationality or sentiment (Baker and Wurgler (2006)), a firm’s stock price 
may be overvalued or undervalued from time to time. Hence we assume that the true value of the 
firm is V(K), while its market value is )()1()( KVKV t
mkt  , where t measures the degree of 
mispricing. The level of initial mispricing is  , which decays over time at a rate of p. That is, 
.ptt e
  A higher p value indicates a shorter duration, and therefore, faster disappearance of 
mispricing. A representative shareholder will have a liquidity need at some point in time. The 
arrival of this liquidity shock follows a Poison process with a mean arrival rate of ).,0( q  A 
larger q indicates that the shareholder horizon is shorter. The representative shareholder’s level 
of income (Yt) is the weighted average of the firm value before and after the true value of the 
firm is revealed.  That is, 
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 Following Polk and Sapienza (2009), we assume that (q + p + q) > 0.  
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Assume that the optimal investment level is K
*
, which is the case where there is no 
mispricing (i.e., 0 ) and no market frictions (i.e., f = 0). In this case, .)( * cKV   The 
implication of equation (1) is that if managers cater to this short-term representative investor, 
they will overinvest when their stocks are overvalued (i.e., 0 ) and underinvest when they are 
undervalued (i.e., 0 ). Polk and Sapienza (2009) also argue that the catering effect is stronger 
for firms with more short-term investors (i.e., larger q) and for firms whose assets are more 
difficult to evaluate (i.e., smaller p or longer durations of mispricing). In addition, our extended 
model suggests that the catering effect should also be more pronounced for firms located in 
countries with a lower cost of raising equity capital (i.e., smaller f). If we further assume that 
,)( KKV  where  < 1 (i.e., decreasing returns to scale), the above arguments can be presented 
mathematically as follows: 
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There is no ambiguity in the signs in equations (2) and (3). Although the signs in equations 
(4) and (5) are somewhat ambiguous, the results that 02 dqdKd   and 02 dpdKd   hold 
true if  > 0. But even if  < 0, the two results hold as long as ).1)(1(||
q
p
    
The catering theory suggests that investment is positively associated with the extent of stock 
market mispricing (equation (2)). We follow Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and use Tobin’s 
Q as our empirical proxy for  , the non-fundamental component of the stock price. In addition, 
equation (3) suggests that the positive sensitivity of investment to stock prices is more 
pronounced for firms located in countries with smaller market frictions (i.e., smaller f) than for 
firms located in countries with larger market frictions. If we average over the overvaluation and 
undervaluation regions, equations (4) to (5) suggest that, in most cases, firms located in countries 
with shorter shareholder horizons (i.e., larger q) or longer durations of mispricing (i.e., smaller p) 
make investments that are more sensitive to stock prices than firms located in countries with 
longer shareholder horizons or faster disappearance of mispricing. As mentioned at the outset, 
we focus on the country-level proxies for f, q, and p to test the cross-country implications of the 
catering channel. In particular, we measure market frictions by the extent of capital market 
development. Following Polk and Sapienza (2009), we measure shareholder horizons inversely 
by share turnover and durations of mispricing by R&D intensity. The above discussion leads to 
our second hypothesis: 
H2: Under the catering channel, investment is more sensitive to stock prices for firms located in 
countries with more developed capital markets, higher share turnover, or higher R&D intensity 
than for firms located in countries with less developed capital markets, lower share turnover, or 
lower R&D intensity. 
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1.3 The joint effects of the equity-financing channel and the catering channel on corporate 
investment 
 
We next examine how the joint effects of the equity-financing channel and the catering 
channel affect corporate investment decisions.  From the above discussion, we can easily form 
our third hypothesis. 
H3: Under both the equity-financing channel and the catering channel, the effect of the equity-
financing channel on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock prices is more pronounced 
for firms located in countries with more developed capital markets, higher share turnover, or 
higher R&D intensity than for firms located in countries with less developed capital markets, 
lower share turnover, or lower R&D intensity. 
 
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
We collect two sets of data. The first set consists of firm-level financial data available from 
Worldscope and Datastream, both of which are provided by Thomson Financial. After 
eliminating countries with less than 100 firm-year observations, we manage to retrieve firm-level 
data for 44 countries. For each firm, we collect financial variables that include capital 
expenditures (including property, plant, and equipment; research and development; and 
acquisitions), cash flow, cash balances, cash dividends, total debt, total assets, and the book 
value of equity from Worldscope; and the market value of equity and stock returns from 
Datastream.  
We exclude firms with missing firm-year observations, firms operating in the financial 
industry (i.e., firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), and firms with a book value of total 
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assets of less than US$10 million.
3
  Overall, our filtering process yields an unbalanced panel of 
239,307 firm-year observations from 44 countries. The sample period is from 1982 to 2008. 
Table 1 presents the sample distribution in terms of the country-level institutional variables. The 
second column of Table 1 reports the total number of firm-year observations for each country in 
the final sample. Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States dominate the sample, each 
with more than 20,000 firm-year observations.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
2.1 Country-level variables 
Our second dataset includes data on three country-level institutional variables and two 
country characteristics. To test equation (3), we need to proxy for the cross-country difference in 
the cost of raising external equity capital. Recent studies have found that the cost of equity 
capital tends to be lower in countries with more developed financial markets and better corporate 
governance (Hail and Leuz (2006); Chen, Chen, and Wei (2009)).
4
 Therefore, our first variable is 
the access-to-equity market index (ACCESS) obtained from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2006). This variable measures the extent of access to the equity market. A higher score 
on this index indicates that a firm can more easily access the equity market, and so the cost 
associated with raising external equity is lower. Our second country-level variable represents 
whether a country belongs to the developed market or not. We follow International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to classify the countries in our sample into 23 developed markets and 21 emerging 
markets. We construct a dummy variable, DEV, which is equal to 1 for firms in the developed 
markets and 0 for firms in the emerging markets.  
                                                          
3
 We use the exchange rates from Datastream to convert the book value of total assets from local currencies to US 
dollars. 
4
 In addition, several recent studies have documented that country-level institutions are important determinants of 
corporate investment decisions (Wurgler (2000); McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2011)). In the context of our study, 
these institutional variables will influence managers’ abilities to exploit the mispricing to raise external equity to 
finance investment needs (McLean, Pontiff, and Watanabe (2010)).  
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Our last variable measures the legal protection of investors or corporate governance. Several 
indexes have been proposed to measure investor protection in the literature. In this study, we use 
the anti-self-dealing (ANTISELF) index borrowed from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (2008) to measure investor protection. These authors argue that as this newly 
constructed index emphasizes private enforcement, it is more grounded in theory and works 
better empirically than the index of anti-director rights constructed by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) or their own revised anti-director rights index. The 
ANTISELF index measures the existence of securities laws and effectiveness of the enforcement 
of those laws. A higher ANTISELF index indicates better legal protection of investors, and so it 
is associated with a lower cost of raising external capital. 
We employ the country-level share turnover (TURNOVER) index to proxy for average 
shareholder horizons. This index is obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators and 
is calculated as the annual average of the total value of stocks traded as a fraction the total value 
of shares outstanding (%) for the period from 1996 to 2005. A higher TURNOVER index 
indicates a shorter shareholder horizon. Finally, we create a country-level R&D intensity (RD) 
index to proxy for the average opacity of a firm’s assets. This index is calculated by taking the 
average of the firm-level research and development expenditures (R&D) divided by total sales 
for all firms with a positive value of R&D expenditures.
5
 A higher RD index indicates that the 
average assets of a firm are more opaque and more difficult to value.  
The third to the sixth columns of Table 1 present the scores of ACCESS, ANTISELF, 
TURNOVR, and RD in each country. ACCESS ranges from 2.78 (Columbia) to 6.74 (United 
States); ANTISELF ranges from 0.09 (Venezuela) to 1.00 (Singapore); TURNOVER ranges from 
7.07% (Columbia) to 286.2% (Pakistan); and RD ranges from 0 (Columbia, Egypt, and 
                                                          
5
 We follow the previous studies to assign a value of 0 if the value of R&D expenditures is missing. 
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Venezuela) to 4.7% (United States). Panels A and B of Table 1 also report the means and 
standard deviations of the four country-level variables for the developed and emerging markets, 
respectively. We observe that developed countries have easier access to capital markets, stronger 
legal protection, and higher R&D intensity. The overall means (standard deviations) of ACCESS, 
ANTISELF, TURNOVER, and RD are 5.18 (0.91), 0.51 (0.24), 77.24% (69.81%), and 1.1% 
(1.6%), respectively. 
  
2.2 Firm-level measures of financial variables 
We use three measures of corporate investment. The first measure is capital investment 
(CAPX) calculated as capital expenditures in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
The second measure, CAPRD, is defined as the sum of capital expenditures and research and 
development expenditures in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. The third 
measure, CAPXRDA, is defined as the sum of capital expenditures, research and development 
expenditures, and acquisitions in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1.  
Cash flow (CF) is calculated as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. Similar to Baker, Stein, and 
Wurgler (2003), we use Tobin’s Q (Q) as our main measure of the non-fundamental component 
of the stock price. Q is calculated as the market value of equity (i.e., the stock price multiplied by 
the number of shares outstanding) plus total assets minus the book value of equity divided by 
total assets at the end of year t-1. In our robustness tests, we also use returns (RET) as an 
alternative measure. RET is calculated as the change in stock price from the end of year t-2 to the 
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end of year t-1.
6
 We winsorize all financial variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile levels to 
minimize the outlier problem. 
 
2.3 Firm-level measures of equity dependence 
Our main measure of equity dependence is the financial flexibility (FF) index. Following 
Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2009), we first compute the 75
th
 percentile of cash 
balance (CASH) and dividend payout ratios (DIV), as well as the 25
th
 percentile of CAPX for 
each country. A firm is considered financially flexible if it has high values of CASH and DIV and 
a low value of CAPX. More specifically, it will be assigned a value of 1 if its CASH value or DIV 
value is greater than the 75
th
 percentile or its CAPX value is below the 25
th
 percentile. In this 
respect, the FF score ranges from 0 to 3. Firms with lower FF scores are considered less 
financially flexible and therefore more equity dependent. In our robustness tests, we also use the 
adjusted KZ index originally constructed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) based on a sample of 49 
low-dividend manufacturing firms in the United States as an alternative measure of equity 
dependence.  
Panel A of Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the financial variables. The mean 
(median) value of CAPX across the 44 sample countries is 7.4% (4.6%). This is slightly lower 
than the mean (median) of 8.2% (6.0%) reported by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) for the 
sample of U.S. firms. In addition, the mean (median) values of CAPXRD and CAPXRDA are 9.5% 
(6.1%) and 11.5% (6.9%), respectively. The mean (median) value of CF is 11.5% (12%), while 
the mean (median) value of the logarithm of Q is 0.3 (0.2). The mean (median) value of the FF 
index is 1.2 (1.0).  
                                                          
6
 In our untabulated tests, we repeat all the empirical analyses using RET as an alternative measure of stock prices 
and obtain results that are similar to those when Tobin’s Q is used. 
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
Additionally, we present the correlations among the firm-level variables and among the 
country-level institutional variables in Panels B and C of Table 2, respectively.
7
 All three 
measures of corporate investment (CAPX, CAPXRD, and CAPXRDA) are positively correlated 
with Q and CF.  These preliminary findings are consistent with the evidence reported in the 
literature in the United States (e.g., Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003)). The correlations among 
the country-level variables are all in the expected signs (i.e., positive) for most of the variables, 
except for the correlation between TURNOVER and ANTISELF, with the magnitudes ranging 
from -0.03 to 0.61. 
 
3. The Role of the Equity-financing Channel in Corporate Investment: Regression Results 
In this section, we first investigate if the empirical evidence found in U.S. firms for the role 
of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003)) can 
be extended to our international sample. Following Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and 
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), we first estimate the following baseline investment equation: 
itititoit ucCFbQaCAPX  1 , (6), 
where CAPXit is the corporate investment of firm i in year t, Qit-1 is firm i’s Tobin’s Q in year t-1, 
and CFit is its cash flow in year t. All these variables are scaled by total assets. The regression 
coefficient b measures the sensitivity of corporate investment to the stock price (as proxied by Q) 
and the regression coefficient c measures the sensitivity of investment to cash flow.  We use the 
panel regression model with country fixed effects to estimate equation (6) for the pooled 
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 The country median values of financial variables are used to compute the correlation coefficients. 
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sample.
8
 uit is the error term which is assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables. To 
mitigate the problems of within-firm serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, we conduct our 
tests by estimating White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors, clustered by 
country. 
In our unreported results, the estimated coefficients of b and c are 0.957 (t-statistic = 17.01) 
and 0.125 (t-statistic = 29.99), respectively. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The finding for our international sample corroborates the prevailing results that both Q and 
CF are positively and significantly correlated with CAPX. Replacing CAPX in equation (6) with 
CAPXRD or CAPXRDA yields similar results. 
 
3.1 The effect of the equity-financing channel on corporate investment: Baseline results 
Our next task is to test the role of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment in the 
international setting. As elaborated earlier, we use the financial flexibility index (FF) as our 
inverse measure of equity dependence to test H1. It is noted that the degree of equity dependence 
decreases with the FF score. We first assign firms to quartile portfolios according to their FF 
scores, where FF1 represents the portfolio of firms with the FF score of 0, and FF4 represents 
the portfolio of firms with the FF score of 3. Firms in the FF1 quartile are the most equity 
dependent, while firms in the FF4 quartile are the least equity dependent. Following Baker, Stein, 
and Wurgler (2003), the assignment of firms is based on the firm’s median FF scores over the 
whole sample period. 
We then estimate the baseline investment equation (6) separately for each FF quartile 
portfolio using the country fixed effects model with year and industry dummies. We follow 
                                                          
8
 We also estimate all our regressions using firm fixed effects and country random effects models and obtain similar 
results. The results are available upon request. 
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Fama and French (1997) in defining the industry classification of our firms. H1 predicts that the 
sensitivity of corporate investment to stock prices should decrease (increase) with the degree of 
financial flexibility (equity dependence). That is, b should decrease with FF quartiles.  
Panel A of Table 3 presents the estimation results of equation (6) for portfolios formed using 
FF and with CAPX as the dependent variable. We observe that the coefficient on Q (i.e., b) 
decreases from 5.194 in the bottom FF quartile to 0.075 in the top FF quartile. We also compute 
the p-value of the F-statistic which essentially tests the hypothesis that the difference in the b 
coefficient between the top and bottom quartile portfolios is zero. We find that the p-value is 
smaller than 0.01. Our evidence indicates that corporate investment is significantly more 
sensitive to stock prices for less financially flexible (or equity-dependent) firms than for more 
financially flexible (or non-equity-dependent) firms in our international sample.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Similarly, Panels B and C of Table 3 present the regression results when the dependent 
variable is replaced by CAPXRD and CAPXRDA, respectively. All the results are consistent with 
the findings reported in Panel A of Table 3. That is, the sensitivity of investment to stock prices 
in general declines with the degree of financial flexibility. More specifically, when CAPXRD is 
the measure of corporate investment, the regression coefficient on Q is 7.076 for the FF1 quartile 
and 2.018 for the FF4 quartile. The difference in the b coefficient between the FF1 quartile and 
the FF4 quartile is significantly positive at the 1% level. When CAPXRDA is the measure of 
corporate investment, the results are even stronger. The regression coefficient on Q is 9.642 for 
the FF1 quartile but only 2.993 for the FF4 quartile. The difference in the b coefficient between 
the two extreme quartiles is also statistically significant at the 1% level.   
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As an alternative specification to test H1, we estimate the following regression for the 
pooled sample: 
,)( 111 ititititititoit udFFcCFFFQbbQaCAPX    (7) 
where FF is the financial flexibility index. The other variables are defined previously. We 
include the interaction term between Q and FF as an additional explanatory variable. The 
coefficient of interest in this case is b1 and we expect the interaction coefficient to be negative 
(i.e., b1 < 0). That is, corporate investment is less sensitive to the stock price for financially 
flexible firms than for financially inflexible firms. Panel D of Table 3 reports the estimation 
results of equation (7). We find that the coefficient of the interaction term, b1, is negative and 
highly significant for all three measures of corporate investment at the 1% level.  More 
specifically, b1 is -2.148, -1.922, and -3.018, when the dependent variable is CAPX, CAPXRD, 
and CAPXRDA, respectively.  
In summary, the empirical results in Table 3 are consistent with H1 and extend the findings 
of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) to our international sample. We conclude that the equity-
financing channel at the firm level explains for the positive relation between corporate 
investment and stock prices among firms in our international sample.
9
  
 
3.2 Inclusion of alternative measures of investment opportunities 
Our regression specifications might suffer from potential problems related to Tobin’s Q 
which we use in this study as a proxy for the non-fundamental component of stock prices. In 
particular, one alternative explanation for our finding is that corporate investment is simply 
responding to investment opportunities. Past studies have also used Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
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 The dependent variable that we use in the subsequent analysis is CAPX. We continue to obtain robust results for 
the other two alternative measures of CAPX. These results are available upon request. 
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growth opportunities. To test the robustness of our results, we include two alternative measures 
of growth opportunities (TAG or SG) separately in the estimation of equation (6) as an additional 
control variable.  TAG is total assets growth and is calculated as the change in total assets from 
the end of year t-1 to the end of year t, divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. SG is sales 
growth and is calculated as the change in total sales from year t-1 to year t, divided by total sales 
in year t-1.  
The results are presented in Panels A and B of Table 4. Our finding of a monotonic decline 
in the magnitude of the regression coefficient on Q from the least financially flexible firms (FF1) 
to the most financially flexible firms (FF4) persists, regardless of which additional measure of 
growth opportunities is included in the regression.  More specifically, the regression coefficient 
on Q decreases monotonically from 3.653 (3.980) in the FF1 group to 0.075 (0.0071) in the FF4 
group when TAG (SG) is included in the regression to proxy for investment opportunities.  The 
difference in the coefficient between the two extreme groups is significant at the 1% level in both 
cases. We further include TAG (or SG) and the interaction term between TAG (or SG) and FF in 
the estimation of equation (7) for the pooled sample. The result from Panel C of Table 4 shows 
that the coefficient on FFQ  continues to be negative with a value of -1.528 (-1.567), when 
TAG (SG) and its interaction with FF are also included in the regression. Both coefficients are 
highly significant at the 1% level. Therefore, our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of other 
measures of growth opportunities. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
3.3 Results from country-by-country analysis 
We next examine whether the role of the equity-financing channel in corporate investment 
as documented in Table 3 is stronger in some countries than in others. Moreover, we 
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acknowledge that the measurements of CAPX, Q, and CF are affected by differences in 
accounting methods and reporting incentives across countries. In order to mitigate this concern, 
we estimate equation (7) for each of the countries in our international sample. Table 5 presents 
the results for the country-by-country analysis. For the sake of brevity, we only present the 
regression coefficient and standard error of FFQ . The regressions yield negative interaction 
coefficients in 35 out of the 44 countries in our international sample.  In addition, among those 
negative coefficients, 15 are significant at the 10% level or better. Therefore, the results in Table 
5 illustrate that the equity-financing channel affects corporate investment in most countries in 
our sample, albeit to different degrees in different countries. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
3.4 Robustness checks 
In this section, we perform a series of robustness checks to examine if our results are 
sensitive to alternative specifications and sub-samples. First, we re-estimate equation (7) using 
the Fama and Macbeth (1973) methodology. The result is reported in Column (1) of Table 6. The 
coefficient on FFQ remains negative and highly significant with a value of -2.016. The 
estimated coefficient is very close to that estimated using the industry- and year-fixed effect 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method reported in Panel D of Table 3. However, the standard error 
is reduced substantially from 0.495 to 0.127. There is a great variation in the number of firm-
year observations among the 44 countries in our sample. To mitigate the concern that our results 
might be driven by a large number of observations from the larger countries, we re-estimate 
equation (7) using the weighted least squares (WLS) methodology, where the weight is the 
inverse of the number of firms in each country in each year. The result is presented in Column (2) 
of Table 6. The coefficient on FFQ is slightly reduced to -1.796, which is still highly 
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significant; the standard error of 0.482 remains very close to the 0.495 reported in Panel D of 
Table 3.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
We then exclude Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States from our sample to 
check if our results would still hold because these three countries dominate our sample 
observations.  The result is presented in Column (3) of Table 6. We also test our results for the 
sample of manufacturing firms only (SIC codes 2000 to 3999).  The finding is reported in 
Column (4) of Table 6.  The results in both Columns (3) and (4) are similar to the results from 
the overall sample--the coefficient on FFQ is negative and highly significant in both cases.
10
 
We next replace the dependent variable by total assets growth (TAG) or the change in 
investment (i.e., ΔCAPX, calculated as the change in capital investment from time t-1 to t, 
divided by total assets at the end of year t-1). The results are reported in Columns (5) and (6) of 
Table 6. We also replace Tobin’s Q by annual stock returns in the previous year (i.e., RET, 
calculated as the change in stock prices from the end of year t-2 to the end of year t-1). The result 
is presented in Column (7) of Table 6. We then replace the FF index with the KZ index (i.e., the 
adjusted Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index) as our measure of equity dependence.
11
 The result is 
shown in Column (8) of Table 6. Since the KZ index is a direct measure of equity dependence, 
we expect the interaction coefficient on KZQ  to be positive. We also include the interaction 
term between CF and FF )( FFCF   in the regression. The result is reported in Column (9) of 
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 In addition, our results (unreported) remain robust even after excluding the periods of financial crises (1987, 1998 
to 2000, and 2008) and in the different sub-periods (pre-1990, 1990 to 2000, and post-2000).   
11 Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) use the KZ-index as their main measure of equity dependence and find similar 
results for U.S. firms. The KZ score is estimated for each firm-year observation using an equation that comprises 
five components. The estimated coefficients of cash flow (CF), dividend payout ratios (DIV), and cash balance 
(CASH) are negatively associated with the KZ index, while leverage (LEV) and Tobin’s Q are positively associated 
with the KZ index. Therefore, firms with a higher KZ score are considered more equity dependent or more reliant on 
external equity financing for their investment projects.  
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Table 6. Finally, we include contemporaneous Q (denoted as Qt) and lagged investment (denoted 
as LCAPX) in our regression specification. The reason for including LCAPX is because a firm’s 
actual investment occurs with a lag (Lamont (2000)). The result is presented in Column (10) of 
Table 6. The results in Columns (5)-(10), except Column (8), show that the regression 
coefficients on the interaction term )( FFQ  are all negative and highly significant, while the 
interaction coefficient on )( KZQ  reported in Column (8) is positive and highly significant.
12
 
In summary, our sensitivity tests show that our main finding of a positive effect of equity 
dependence or a negative effect of financial flexibility on the sensitivity of investment to stock 
prices in our international sample survives all robustness checks. This suggests that the role of 
the equity-financing channel in corporate investment decisions is robust.  
 
4. The Role of the Catering Channel in Corporate Investment: Regression Results 
In this section, we formally examine whether the catering channel also plays an important 
role in corporate investment. In particular, H2 posits that the sensitivity of investment to stock 
prices should be higher for firms located in countries where the costs associated with raising 
external equity capital for investment needs are lower, or for firms whose shareholders have 
shorter investment horizons, or for firms whose assets are more difficult to value. To test this 
hypothesis, we first partition our whole sample into two sub-samples according to the median 
value of ACCESS, ANTISELF, TURNOVER, or RD, or whether the dummy variable DEV is 0 or 
1. We then estimate equation (6) for each of the two sub-samples. The prediction from the first 
part of H2 is that the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock prices is higher in countries 
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 We also use firm size, which is computed as the natural logarithm of total assets, as another alternative measure of 
equity dependence. The smaller the firm is, the more equity dependent it should be. Our results remain unchanged. 
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where the cost of raising external equity is lower and is lower in countries where the financing 
cost is higher.  
Panel A of Table 7 present the estimation results of equation (6) for the two sub-samples 
based on the above three country-level institutional variables (ACCESS, ANTISELF, and DEV). 
Consistent with the prediction of H2, we find that sensitivities of investment to stock prices (as 
measured by the coefficient of b in equation (6)) are higher for the sub-sample of firms located in 
countries with a high score on ACCESS and ANTISELF, and for firms in developed markets than 
for firms in the other sub-samples. For example, when ACCESS is used as a measure of external-
financing costs, the estimated coefficient of b increases from 1.456 in the low sub-sample to 
4.291 in the high sub-sample. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. We 
also conduct the F-test which essentially tests the hypothesis that the difference in the coefficient 
of b between the high and low sub-samples is zero. As expected, the F-statistic is positive and 
highly significant at the 1% level or better. When ANTISELF is used as a measure of external-
financing costs, the regression coefficient of Q (i.e., b) increases from 1.525 in the low sub-
sample to 4.072 in the high sub-sample. The difference in the regression coefficient of Q is 
highly significant at the 1% level or better. Investment is also significantly more sensitive to 
stock prices for firms in developed markets (with b = 4.056) than for firms in emerging markets 
(b = 1.602).  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The second part of H2 predicts that corporate investment is also more sensitive to stock 
prices for firms located in countries where shareholders have shorter horizons and for firms 
whose average assets are more opaque. We find the results to be consistent with the predictions 
of the catering theory (Panel A of Table 7) when we use TURNOVER as an inverse measure of 
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average shareholder horizons and RD as a direct measure of asset opacity. For example, when 
TURNOVER is the partitioning variable, the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is 3.947 for 
the high TURNOVER sub-sample firms and 2.693 for the low TURNOVER sub-sample firms. 
When RD is the partitioning variable, the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is 3.933 for the 
high RD sub-sample firms and 1.843 for the low RD sub-sample firms. The difference in the 
regression coefficient of Q between the high and low sub-samples is significant at the 1% level 
or better in both cases. 
As an alternative specification to test H2, we estimate the following regression for the 
pooled sample using the random effects model: 
,)( 1211 titiitiitoit ucCFCOUNTRYQbCOUNTRYbbQaCAPX    (8) 
where COUNTRY is a dummy variable that equals 1 for countries with a high score on ACCESS, 
ANTISELF, TURNOVER, or RD, and for developed countries, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient 
of interest in this case is the coefficient on the interaction term between Q and COUNTRY, b2. 
H2 predicts that the coefficient of b2 should be positive.  We estimate equation (8) by including 
the interaction of each of the five country-level variables with Tobin’s Q as an additional 
regressor.  Panel B of Table 7 presents the estimation results for the pooled sample. Consistent 
with the findings in Panel A of Table 7, we find that the coefficients of the interaction term (i.e., 
b2) are all positive and significant at the 10% level or better.  More specifically, b2 is significant 
at the 1% level for Q interacted with ACCESS or DEV, at the 5% level for Q interacted with 
ANTISELF or TURNOVER, and at the 10% level for Q interacted with RD. The results again 
appear to support H2.
13
  
                                                          
13 In our unreported results, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term between our country-level variables 
and CF is negative and significant at the 1% level for all five country-level variables. 
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Our findings in this section highlight the important roles that the various country-level 
variables which proxy for the costs of raising external capital, average shareholder horizons, and 
opacity of assets, play in the relation between corporate investment and stock prices. In general, 
our results suggest that the non-fundamental component of stock prices is a better predictor of 
investment for firms in countries where the costs of raising external equity are lower, or where 
average shareholder horizons are shorter, or for firms whose assets are more difficult to evaluate. 
The results support the catering theory of investment proposed by Polk and Sapienza (2009). 
 
5. The Joint Roles of the Equity-Financing and Catering Channels in Corporate 
Investment 
 
In this section, we explore the joint effects of the equity-financing and catering channels on 
corporate investment behavior in our international sample. Specifically, we test whether the 
ability of managers to engage in market timing is attenuated or intensified in countries with a 
lower external equity-financing cost.  
We continue to use the partitioned samples based on each of the country-level variables used 
in the previous section and re-estimate equation (7) for each of them. The investment regressions 
are estimated using the country fixed effects model, with year and industry dummies and White’s 
heteroskedasticity-corrected clustered standard errors. The results are reported in Panel A of 
Table 8. When ACCESS is used as the country-level partitioning variable, we find that the 
coefficient on the interaction term between Q and FF is more negative in the high ACCESS sub-
sample (-2.070) than in the low ACCESS sub-sample (-1.329). This is consistent with our 
hypothesis that the role of the equity-financing channel is more pronounced in countries with 
easier access to equity markets. Moreover, the F-statistic that tests the difference in the 
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coefficient on FFQ  between the two sub-samples is highly significant with a p-value of less 
than 0.01.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
We also find that the effect of the equity-financing channel is significantly stronger (with a 
p-value of less than 0.01) for firms in developed markets (coefficient of QFF = -2.242) than for 
firms in emerging markets (coefficient of QFF = -1.533).  The same pattern is also found for 
firms split by ANTISELF, TURNOVER, or RD. The coefficient of QFF is -2.243 for firms from 
the high ANTISELF sub-sample and -1.570 for firms from the low ANTISELF sub-sample. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of QFF is -2.236 (-2.215) for firms from the high TURNOVER (RD) 
sub-sample and -1.534 (-1.532) for firms from the low TURNOVER (RD) sub-sample. The 
differences in the estimated coefficients of QFF between the two sub-samples are highly 
significant at the 1% level or better with the correct signs in all three cases. 
As an alternative specification to test H3, we estimate the following regression for the 
pooled sample using the random effects model: 
,)(
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 (9) 
where all variables are defined previously. We include three interaction terms, QFF, 
QCOUNTRY, and QFFCOUNTRY, as additional explanatory variables. The coefficient of 
interest in this case is b3 and we expect this coefficient to be negative. That is, corporate 
investment is more sensitive to stock prices for non-financially flexible (i.e., equity-dependent) 
firms than for financially flexible (i.e., non-equity-dependent) firms and the effect of this equity-
financing channel should be stronger in countries where the external financing costs are lower, or 
where shareholders have shorter horizons, or for firms whose assets are more difficult to value.  
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Panel B of Table 8 presents the estimation results of equation (9). In all specifications, we 
find that the coefficient of the interaction term COUNTRYFFQ   is negative with a value 
ranging from -1.232 to -1.693 and is highly significant at the 1% level. These findings are 
consistent with the argument that managers of equity-dependent firms will invest more in 
response to an increase in their stock price when the associated costs of raising external equity 
are lower, which is the case in countries with more developed institutions. Therefore, more 
developed institutions allow managers who are adept at timing the market to exploit the 
mispricing in stock prices. In addition, consistent with the evidence in Panel B of Table 7, we 
find that the coefficient of QCOUNTRY continues to be positive for all specifications at the 1% 
level.  Furthermore, consistent with the evidence in Panel D of Table 3 and Panel C of Table 4, 
the coefficient of QFF continues to be negative and significant at the 1% level for all five 
specifications.   
Finally, we also include two interaction terms, COUNTRYQ and COUNTRYFFQ  , and 
repeat the robustness tests in Section 3.4. Our findings (unreported) are unchanged. That is, the 
interaction coefficient on COUNTRYQ retains its expected positive sign, while the coefficients 
on FFQ  and on COUNTRYFFQ  remain negative and significant at least at the 
conventional levels. On the whole, our results suggest that the equity-financing channel and the 
catering channel work together in driving managers’ investment decisions for our international 
sample 
 
6. An Alternative Interpretation of Some of our Results: The q-Theory 
Equation (3) states that the positive relation between corporate investment and stock 
mispricing is stronger for firms in countries with low market frictions than for firms in countries 
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with high market frictions. This relation is also consistent with the q-theory with investment 
frictions or adjustment costs proposed by Cochrane (1991, 1996), Li and Zhang (2010), among 
others. The q-theory with investment frictions proposed by Li and Zhang (2010) suggests that 
corporate investment is more responsive to the change in the cost of capital for firms in countries 
with low investment frictions than for firms in countries with high investment frictions. The 
measures of investment frictions would be empirically distinguishable from the measures of 
market frictions. Therefore, if the change in the cost of capital reflects the change in mispricing, 
our results in Tables 7 and 8 are also supportive of the q-theory with investment frictions when 
ACCESS, DEV, and ANTISELF are used as the inverse measures of market frictions.
 14
  
Although the predictions from the q-theory and the catering theory are the same, the 
underlying intuitions and assumptions are different. The q-theory assumes that the stock market 
is always rational, but the cost of capital may change from time to time and across firms due to 
the change in investor risk aversion. Managers of firms will invest more when the expected cost 
of capital is lower and invest less when the expected cost of capital is higher. On the other hand, 
the catering theory assumes that due to investor irrationality, stock markets may be overvalued or 
undervalued from time to time and across firms. If mangers are assumed to cater to short-term 
shareholders, they will invest more when their shares are overvalued and invest less when their 
shares are undervalued.   
 
7. Conclusions 
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 where  > 0 is a cost parameter (i.e., a measure of investment 
frictions) and R is the gross discount rate.  Since the market value of a firm (V
mkt
) and its expected cost of capital (R) 
are negatively correlated (i.e., 0
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  Since  is analogous to our measure 
of market frictions (f) and V
mk
 is positively associated with our measure of mispricing (), our equation (3) is 
equivalent to Li and Zhang’s equation (6). 
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We have investigated how stock market mispricing affects corporate investment decisions 
through the equity-financing channel proposed by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) and the 
catering channel suggested by Polk and Sapienza (2009) using an international sample covering 
44 countries. Our first main result is that the previous finding that the equity-financing channel 
affects the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock prices extends to our international sample. 
We have then shown that corporate investment is more sensitive to stock prices for firms in 
countries with more developed capital markets, higher share turnover, and higher R&D intensity. 
Since the degree of capital market development proxies for the cost of raising external capital, 
the result is consistent with the prediction of the extended catering theory of investment. In 
addition, by examining the interaction between firm-level equity dependence and country-level 
institutions, we have found that the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is most pronounced 
for equity-dependent firms in countries with more developed capital markets, higher share 
turnover, and higher R&D intensity. The analysis based on capital market development suggests 
that managers of equity-dependent firms are better able to engage in market timing in countries 
where the costs of raising external equity are relatively lower. 
As an aside, we have provided corroborating evidence that helps to explain the cross-country 
difference in the determinants of corporate investment decisions. In addition, by using the 
sensitivity of investment to stock prices as a measure of the efficiency of capital allocation as 
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) have done, we have shown that the presence of strong 
institutions enables equity-dependent firms to allocate capital to investment projects more 
efficiently, through the equity-financing channel and the catering channel. 
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Appendix: Variable definition 
 
Variable name Definition Source 
Country-level variables 
ACCESS Access to external equity index La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer, (2006) 
DEV A dummy variable which equals 1 for developed countries and 0 
for emerging countries. 
IMF 
ANTISELF Anti-self-dealing index Djankov et al. (2008) 
TURNOVER Share turnover index, calculated as the average total value of 
stocks traded as a fraction of the shares outstanding for the period 
1996-2005. 
World Bank Development 
Indicators at 
http://www.worldbank.org 
RD R&D intensity, calculated as the average of firm-level research and 
development expenditures divided by total sales. 
Worldscope 
Firm-Level Variables 
CAPX Capital investment, calculated as capital expenditures in year t 
divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
Worldscope 
CAPXRD Alternative measure of capital investment, calculated as capital 
expenditures plus research and development expenditures in year t 
divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
Worldscope 
CAPXRDA Alternative measure of capital investment, calculated as capital 
expenditures plus research and development expenditures plus 
acquisitions in year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
Worldscope 
FF Financial flexibility index Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, 
Miller, and Stulz (2009)  
Q The logarithm of Tobin’s Q, calculated as market value of equity 
plus total assets minus total equity in year t-1divided by total assets 
at the end of year t-1.  
Worldscope 
CF Cash flow, calculated as income before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and amortization in year t divided by total assets at the 
end of year t-1. 
Worldscope 
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Table 1 
Country-level variables 
 
This table presents the country-level variables for our sample. ACCESS is a country-level measure of ease of access 
to external equity markets. ANTISELF is the anti-self-dealing index. TURNOVER is the share turnover index. RD is 
the R&D intensity index. The detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. The sample 
consists of 44 countries and covers the period from 1982 to 2008. 
 
Panel A: Developed markets 
Country 
 
Firm-year 
observations 
ACCESS 
 
ANTISELF 
 
TURNOVER 
 
RD 
 
Australia  6,846 6.00 0.76 64.08 0.018 
Austria  1,122 4.89 0.21 36.10 0.011 
Belgium  1,492 5.70 0.54 27.91 0.013 
Canada  10,648 6.39 0.64 62.12 0.029 
Denmark  2,072 5.87 0.46 69.68 0.021 
Finland  1,699 6.37 0.46 80.77 0.022 
France  8,726 5.75 0.38 77.60 0.013 
Germany  8,289 5.93 0.28 107.82 0.018 
Greece  1,253 5.28 0.22 58.71 0.003 
Hong Kong  5,932 5.50 0.96 54.12 0.004 
Ireland  932 5.29 0.79 48.51 0.010 
Italy  2,976 4.41 0.42 96.87 0.009 
Japan  34,950 4.92 0.50 69.52 0.014 
The Netherlands  2,708 6.43 0.20 112.11 0.012 
New Zealand  901 5.82 0.95 38.40 0.004 
Norway  1,851 5.57 0.42 87.98 0.015 
Portugal  696 4.50 0.44 59.98 0.000 
Singapore  4,076 5.50 1.00 47.17 0.003 
Spain  1,969 5.09 0.37 172.89 0.003 
Sweden  3,128 6.15 0.33 95.72 0.032 
Switzerland  2,787 6.07 0.27 89.37 0.027 
United Kingdom  20,758 6.26 0.95 81.11 0.020 
United States  68,482 6.74 0.65 140.88 0.047 
Mean  5.67 0.53 77.37 0.015 
Std dev  0.62 0.26 34.00 0.011 
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Table 1 - Continued 
 
Panel B: Emerging markets 
Country 
 
Firm-year 
observations 
ACCESS 
 
ANTISELF 
 
TURNOVER 
 
RD 
 
Argentina  539 3.23 0.34 16.563 0.000 
Brazil  2,104 4.05 0.27 47.499 0.001 
Chile  1,418 4.80 0.63 10.020 0.000 
Colombia  209 2.78 0.57 7.070 0.000 
Egypt  139 5.20 0.20 24.279 0.000 
India  5,228 5.30 0.58 152.992 0.004 
Indonesia  1,862 4.53 0.65 45.155 0.000 
Israel  895 5.35 0.73 45.973 0.086 
Korea (South) 6,992 5.02 0.47 247.772 0.009 
Malaysia  6,632 5.11 0.95 39.230 0.001 
Mexico  1,080 3.90 0.17 30.437 0.000 
Pakistan  935 . 0.41 286.200 0.000 
Peru  511 3.84 0.45 14.485 0.002 
Philippines  1,008 4.62 0.22 23.812 0.001 
South Africa  3,271 5.94 0.81 34.400 0.002 
Sri Lanka  159 . 0.39 17.242 0.000 
Taiwan  7,825 5.54 0.56 314.740 0.024 
Thailand  3,165 4.24 0.81 79.703 0.000 
Turkey  1,368 5.03 0.43 156.107 0.003 
Venezuela  148 3.51 0.09 10.771 0.000 
Zimbabwe  126 4.93 0.39 14.543 0.003 
Mean  4.57 0.48 77.095 0.006 
Std dev  0.84 0.23 95.955 0.019 
Overall mean  5.18 0.51 77.237 0.011 
Overall Std dev  0.91 0.24 69.813 0.016 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
 
Panel A of this table presents the summary statistics of the financial variables. CAPX is a measure of capital investment. CAPXRD is a measure of CAPX plus 
R&D expenditures. CAPXRDA is a measure of CAPXRD plus acquisitions. Ln(Q) is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. FF is the financial 
flexibility index. Panel B presents the correlations among the firm-level financial variables. Panel C presents the Pearson correlations among the country-level 
variables. ACCESS is a country-level measure of ease of access to external equity. DEV is a dummy variable that equals one for developed countries and zero for 
emerging countries. ANTISELF is the anti-self-dealing index. TURNOVER is the share turnover index. RND is the R&D intensity index. The detailed definitions 
of these variables are provided in the Appendix. The sample period is from 1982 to 2008. 
 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std dev Min Max 1
st
 Quartile 3
rd
 Quartile 
CAPX (%) 239,907 7.389 4.581 10.022 0.000 88.686 2.057 8.799 
CAPXRD (%) 239,907 9.480 6.061 12.421 0.000 130.359 2.745 11.558 
CAPXRDA (%) 239,907 11.524 6.860 16.723 0.000 165.624 3.049 13.453 
Ln(Q) 239,907 0.300 0.191 0.524 -0.736 3.483 -0.032 0.532 
CF (%) 239,907 11.459 12.007 20.114 -443.100 75.238 5.851 18.785 
FF 239,907 1.155 1.000 0.715 0.000 3.000 1.000 2.000 
Panel B: Correlations among firm-level variables 
Variable CAPX CAPXRD CAPXRDA Ln(Q) CF    
CAPXRD 0.859        
CAPXRDA 0.687 0.800       
Ln(Q) 0.203 0.333 0.333      
CF 0.151 0.129 0.134 0.321     
FF 0.124 -0.030 -0.003 0.072 0.179    
Panel C: Correlations among country-level institutional variables 
 ACCESS DEV ANTISELF TURNOVER     
DEV  0.608        
ANTISELF 0.264 0.101       
TURNOVER 0.336 0.002 -0.034      
RD 0.501 0.274 0.133 0.159     
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Table 3 
Financial flexibility and corporate investment 
 
Panels A to C of this table present the coefficients of investment regressions based on equation (6) in the main text 
for each portfolio formed according to the measures of financial flexibility. The dependent variables are CAPX, 
CAPXRD, and CAPXRDA, respectively. CAPX is a measure of capital investment. CAPXRD is a measure of CAPX 
plus R&D expenditures. CAPXRDA is a measure of CAPXRD plus acquisitions. Q is Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. FF 
is the financial flexibility index. The detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. Panel D 
presents the results for the pooled sample obtained by including the interaction term, Q  FF. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses, clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
 (1) 
FF1 
(2) 
FF2 
(3) 
FF3 
(4) 
FF4 
Panel A: CAPX is the dependent variable 
Q  5.194
***
 5.085
***
 2.359
***
 0.075
***
 
  (0.897) (0.630) (0.260) (0.027) 
CF  0.073
***
 0.016 0.089
***
 0.003
***
 
  (0.012) (0.018) (0.031) (0.001) 
Industry and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N)  37,222 136,549 57,807 8,329 
R-squared  0.252 0.144 0.184 0.371 
Panel B: CAPXRD is the dependent variable 
Q  7.076
***
 8.505
***
 5.733
***
 2.018
***
 
  (0.253) (0.163) (0.210) (0.303) 
CF  0.038
***
 -0.054 -0.034
***
 -0.076
***
 
  (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.021) 
Industry and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N)  37,222 136,549 57,807 8,329 
R-squared  0.229 0.190 0.180 0.266 
Panel C: CAPXRDA is the dependent variable 
Q  9.642
***
 10.770
***
 7.029
***
 2.992
***
 
  (0.325) (0.203) (0.257) (0.398) 
CF  0.089
***
 -0.050
***
 -0.006 -0.057
**
 
  (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.024) 
Industry and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N)  37,222 136,549 57,807 8,329 
R-squared  0.206 0.179 0.147 0.129 
Panel D: Pooled sample regressions  
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
CAPX 
(2) 
CAPXRD 
(3) 
CAPXRDA 
Q 6.868
***
 9.703
***
 9.808
***
 
 (1.059) (0.881) (1.113) 
CF 0.043
**
 -0.038 0.065
***
 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.018) 
FF -2.371
***
 -2.127
***
 -2.490
***
 
 (0.182) (0.175) (0.255) 
Q  FF -2.148
***
 -1.922
***
 -3.018
***
 
 (0.495) (0.577) (0.430) 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 239,907 239,907 239,907 
R-Squared 0.191 0.199 0.159 
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Table 4 
Financial flexibility and corporate investment controlling for investment opportunities 
 
Panels A and B of this table present the investment regression coefficients based on equation (7) for each portfolio 
formed according to the measures of financial flexibility (FF). The dependent variable is CAPX. CAPX is a measure 
of capital investment. Q is Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. FF is the financial flexibility index. TAG is total assets 
growth and SG is sales growth. The detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. Panel C 
presents the results for the pooled sample. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by country and 
robust to heteroskedasticity.  
*
, 
**
, 
***
 denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
 (1) 
FF1 
(2) 
FF2 
(3) 
FF3 
(4) 
FF4 
Panel A: TAG as the measure of growth opportunities 
Q  3.653
***
 2.579
***
 1.211
***
 0.075
***
 
  (0.206) (0.102) (0.097) (0.020) 
TAG  0.067
***
 0.060
***
 0.044
***
 -0.000 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
CF  0.047
***
 0.042
***
 0.080
***
 0.003
***
 
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
Industry and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N)  37,222 136,549 57,807 8,329 
R-squared  0.323 0.273 0.304 0.371 
Panel B: SG as the measure of growth opportunities 
Q  3.980
***
 3.402
***
 1.797
***
 0.071
***
 
  (0.204) (0.115) (0.107) (0.026) 
SG  0.044
***
 0.047
***
 0.040
***
 0.050
**
 
  (0.262) (0.162) (0.211) (0.024) 
CF  0.082
***
 0.050
***
 0.087
***
 0.003
***
 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) 
Industry and year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations (N)  36,705 135,120 57,029 8,297 
R-squared  0.279 0.175 0.232 0.375 
Panel C: Pooled sample 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
Q 4.157
***
 4.853
***
 
 (0.140) (0.142) 
TAG 0.074
***
  
 (0.002)  
SG  0.053
***
 
  (0.002) 
CF 0.053
***
 0.066
***
 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
FF -2.319
***
 -2.227
***
 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
Q  FF -1.528
***
 -1.567
***
 
 (0.076) (0.075) 
TAG  FF -0.015
***
  
 (0.002)  
SG  FF  -0.007
***
 
  (0.001) 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations (N) 239,907 237,151 
R-Squared 0.305 0.230 
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Table 5 
Country-by-country regressions 
 
This table presents the coefficients of the interaction term between Tobin’s Q and the measure of financial flexibility 
(FF) obtained from the following investment regression for each country in our sample: 
,)( 111 ititititititoit udFFcCFFFQbbQaCAPX    
where CAPX is capital investment. Q is Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. FF is the financial flexibility index. The 
detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, 
clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
*
, 
**
, 
***
 denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 5 – Continued 
 
Country Coefficients on Q  FF Standard errors 
Argentina -0.704 (0.924) 
Australia -3.696
***
 (0.623) 
Austria -2.357 (2.189) 
Belgium -2.306
**
 (0.958) 
Brazil 0.263 (1.002) 
Canada -3.386
***
 (0.473) 
Chile -1.907 (1.290) 
Colombia -1.976 (2.024) 
Denmark -0.761 (0.582) 
Egypt -0.042 (3.345) 
Finland -0.627 (0.810) 
France -0.863
**
 (0.398) 
Germany -1.199
***
 (0.395) 
Greece -0.978 (0.856) 
Hong Kong -0.625 (0.390) 
India -0.020 (0.514) 
Indonesia 0.178 (0.831) 
Ireland -0.360 (0.897) 
Israel -0.597 (0.453) 
Italy -1.442
**
 (0.730) 
Japan -0.649
***
 (0.163) 
Korea -0.854
*
 (0.503) 
Malaysia -1.096
***
 (0.378) 
Mexico 0.659 (0.759) 
The Netherlands -0.997
*
 (0.513) 
New Zealand -0.656 (0.837) 
Norway -0.955 (1.144) 
Pakistan -0.912 (2.686) 
Peru 0.663 (0.918) 
Philippines -0.197 (0.869) 
Portugal 0.033 (1.513) 
Singapore -0.202 (0.650) 
South Africa -1.614
*
 (0.845) 
Spain -0.308 (0.794) 
Sri Lanka -1.740 (2.827) 
Sweden -1.169
***
 (0.429) 
Switzerland -0.470 (0.488) 
Taiwan -1.457
***
 (0.367) 
Thailand -0.738 (0.656) 
Turkey 2.224 (1.449) 
United Kingdom -1.485
***
 (0.281) 
United States -1.331
***
 (0.125) 
Venezuela 0.060 (1.769) 
Zimbabwe 5.146
*
 (2.964) 
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Table 6 
Robustness tests 
This table presents the coefficients from the investment regression for the pooled sample based on different model specifications, estimation methods, and sub-
samples. The dependent variable is CAPX, which is a measure of capital investment. Q is Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. FF is the financial flexibility index. TAG is 
total assets growth. RET is the annual stock return during year t-1. KZ is the adjusted Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index. The detailed definitions of these variables 
are provided in the Appendix. LCAPX is the lagged one-period CAPX. Qt is the contemporaneous Q. ΔCAPX is the change in CAPX between year t and year t-1. 
Column (1) reports the result from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression procedure. Column (2) reports the result based on the weighted least squares (WLS), 
where the weight is the inverse of the number of firms in each country in each month. Column (3) reports the result of excluding firms from Japan, the U.K., and 
the U.S. Column (4) reports the result of including manufacturing firms only. Column (5) reports the result of including TAG as a control for investment 
opportunities. Column (6) reports the result of replacing CAPX with ΔCAPX. Column (7) reports the result of replacing Q with RET. Column (8) reports the 
result of replacing FF with the KZ index. Column (9) reports the result of including the interaction term, FFCF, as an additional control. Column (10) reports 
the result of including two additional controls, LCAPX and Qt. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity.  
*
, 
**
, 
***
 denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 – Continued 
 
Variables 
(1) 
FM 
 
 
(2) 
WLS 
 
 
(3) 
Exclude 
Japan/UK/US 
 
(4) 
Manufacturing 
firms 
 
(5) 
TAG 
 
 
(6) 
ΔCAPX 
 
 
(7) 
RET 
 
 
(8) 
KZ 
 
 
(9) 
Including 
CF  FF 
 
(10) 
Including 
LCAPX 
and Qt 
Q 5.724
***
 6.319
***
 8.414
***
 5.034
***
 40.857
***
 0.966
***
  4.994
***
 6.933
***
 4.396
***
 
 (0.897) (0.931) (1.818) (0.296) (3.279) (0.158)  (0.503) (1.110) (0.573) 
RET       3.206
***
    
       (0.574)    
CF 0.127
***
 0.124
***
 0.060
*
 0.051
*
 -0.157 0.005 0.041
**
 0.070
***
 0.027 0.026
**
 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.034) (0.029) (0.126) (0.007) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.013) 
Qt          -0.072 
          (0.050) 
LCAPX          0.438
***
 
          (0.017) 
FF -2.421
***
 -2.345
***
 -2.408
***
 -1.628
***
 1.433 -2.804
***
 -2.804
***
  -2.500
***
 -1.358
***
 
 (0.037) (0.123) (0.175) (0.131) (1.149) (0.243) (0.243)  (0.222) (0.090) 
Q  FF -2.016
***
 -1.796
***
 -2.896
***
 -1.447
***
 -5.062
***
 -0.127
**
 -0.648
***
  -2.218
***
 -1.251
***
 
 (0.127) (0.482) (0.723) (0.138) (1.329) (0.060) (0.251)  (0.566) (0.286) 
CF  FF         0.014  
         (0.016)  
KZ        0.254
***
   
        (0.087)   
Q  KZ        0.597
***
   
        (0.075)   
Industry and year 
fixed-effects 
 Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations (N)  239,907 115,717 121,397 239,907 235,134 239,907 229,870 239,907 239,907 
R-squared  0.233 0.175 0.147 0.120 0.007 0.161 0.158 0.192 0.382 
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Table 7 
The catering channel and corporate investment: The effect of the cross-country difference in the cost of raising external capital 
 
Panel A of this table presents the coefficients from the investment regressions based on equation (6) in the main text. All firms are split into two groups (High 
and Low) based on the scores of ACCESS (Columns (1) and (2)), ANTISELF (Columns (5) and (6)), TURNOVER (Columns (7) and (8)), or RND (Columns (9) 
and (10)).  All firms are also split into the emerging market group (Column (3) and the developed market group (Column (4)). The dependent variable is CAPX, 
which is a measure of capital investment. Q is Tobin’s Q. CF is cash flow. FF is the financial flexibility index. ACCESS is a country-level measure of ease of 
access to external equity markets. DEV is a dummy variable that equals one for developed countries and zero for emerging countries. ANTISELF is the anti-self-
dealing index. TURNOVER is the share turnover index. RD is the R&D intensity index. COUNTRY is one of the five country-level variables above used in the 
pooled sample regressions. The detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. The F-test is the test of the difference in coefficients of Q 
between the two sub-samples. Panel B reports the results from pooled regressions that include an interaction term, Q  COUNTRY. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses, clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Split-sample regressions 
Variables 
(1) 
Low  
ACCESS 
(2) 
High 
ACCESS 
(3) 
Emerging 
Markets 
(4) 
Developed 
Markets 
(5) 
Low 
ANTISELF 
(6) 
High 
ANTISELF 
(7) 
Low 
TURNOVER 
(8) 
High 
TURNOVER 
(9) 
Low 
RD 
(10) 
High 
RD 
Q 1.456
***
 4.291
***
 1.602
***
 4.056
***
 1.525
***
 4.072
***
 2.693
***
 3.947
***
  1.843
***
 3.933
***
 
 (0.199) (0.108) (0.264) (0.100) (0.298) (0.098) (0.295) (0.099) (0.358) (0.097) 
CF 0.158
***
 0.024
***
 0.161
***
 0.024
***
 0.171
***
 0.025
***
 0.126
***
 0.027
***
 0.191
***
 0.026
***
 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) 
p-value 11.81 
(0.00) 
75.97 
(0.00) 
65.98 
(0.00) 
16.25 
(0.00) 
31.84 
(0.00)  
Industry and year 
Fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 71,199 168,708 45,614 194,293 43,622 196,285 45,614 194,293 43,622 196,285 
R-squared 0.173 0.141 0.159 0.158 0.155 0.154 0.159 0.158 0.155 0.154 
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Table 7 – Continued 
 
Panel B: Pooled-sample regressions 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
ACCESS 
(2) 
DEV 
(3) 
ANTISELF 
(4) 
TURNOVER 
(5) 
RD 
Q 2.534
***
 3.339
***
 2.571
***
 3.528
***
 3.569
***
 
 (0.108) (0.142) (0.156) (0.171) (0.177) 
CF 0.040
***
 0.039
***
 0.040
***
 0.039
***
 0.039
***
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
COUNTRY -0.601
***
 -1.616
***
 -0.776
***
 -0.394
*
 -0. 930
***
 
 (0.233) (0.232) (0.217) (0.222) (0.219) 
Q  COUNTRY 1.687
***
 0.611
***
 1.466
**
 0.362
**
 0.308
*
 
 (0.123) (0.150) (0.162) (0.178) (0.183) 
Industry and year  
Fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 239,907 239,907 239,907 239,907 239,907 
R-squared 0.116 0.120 0.117 0.116 0.116 
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Table 8 
The joint effects of the equity-financing channel and the catering channel on corporate investment 
 
Panel A of this table presents the coefficients of Q from the investment regressions based on equation (7) in the main text. All firms are split into two groups 
(High and Low) based on the scores of ACCESS (Columns (1) and (2)), ANTISELF (Columns (5) and (6)), TURNOVER (Columns (7) and (8)), or RD (Columns 
(9) and (10)).  All firms are also split into the emerging market group (Column (3) and the developed market group (Column (4)). The dependent variable is 
CAPX, which is a measure of capital investment. Q is Tobin’s Q. FF is the financial flexibility index. ACCESS is a country-level measure of ease of access to 
external equity markets. DEV is a dummy variable that equals one for developed countries and zero for emerging countries. ANTISELF is the anti-self-dealing 
index. TURNOVER is the share turnover index. RD is the R&D intensity index. COUNTRY is one of the five country-level variables above used in the pooled 
sample regressions. The detailed definitions of these variables are provided in the Appendix. The F-test is the test of the difference in coefficients of Q  FF 
between the two sub-samples. Panel B reports the results from pooled regressions that include two additional interaction terms, Q  COUNTRY and Q  FF  
COUNTRY. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered by country and robust to heteroskedasticity. 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Split-sample regressions 
Variables 
(1) 
Low  
ACCESS 
(2) 
High 
ACCESS 
(3) 
Emerging 
Markets 
(4) 
Developed 
Markets 
(5) 
Low 
ANTISELF 
(6) 
High 
ANTISELF 
(7) 
Low 
TURNOVER 
(8) 
High 
TURNOVER 
(9) 
Low 
RD 
(10) 
High 
RD 
Q 3.486
***
 7.167
***
 3.892
***
 7.159
***
 4.021
***
 7.175
***
 4.878
***
 7.089
***
 4.083
***
 7.025
***
 
 (0.305) (0.175) (0.379) (0.168) (0.411) (0.166) (0.419) (0.166) (0.495) (0.163) 
CF 0.174
***
 0.026
***
 0.181
***
 0.027
***
 0.186
***
 0.028
***
 0.141
***
 0.031
***
 0.210
***
 0.029
***
 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) 
FF -1.888
***
 -2.712
***
 -2.286
***
 -2.429
***
 -2.099
***
 -2.484
***
 -2.228
***
 -2.418
***
 -2.316
***
 -2.424
***
 
 (0.055) (0.050) (0.079) (0.042) (0.095) (0.040) (0.091) (0.041) (0.099) (0.040) 
Q  FF -1.329
***
 -2.070
***
 -1.533
***
 -2.242
***
 -1.570
***
 -2.243
***
 -1.534
***
 -2.236
***
 -1.532
***
 -2.215
***
 
 (0.141) (0.095) (0.196) (0.087) (0.204) (0.086) (0.226) (0.085) (0.265) (0.084) 
p-value 19.22 
(0.00) 
10.93 
(0.00) 
8.43 
(0.00) 
6.06 
(0.01) 
9.22 
(0.00)  
Industry and year 
Fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 71,199 168,708 45,614 194,293 43,622 196,285 35,809 204,098 33,569 206,338 
R-squared 0.205 0.197 0.189 0.213 0.188 0.208 0.173 0.206 0.196 0.207 
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Table 8 – Continued 
 
Panel B: Pooled-sample regressions 
Independent variables 
 
(1) 
ACCESS 
(2) 
DEV 
(3) 
ANTISELF 
(4) 
TURNOVER 
(5) 
RD 
Q 3.850
***
 5.087
***
 4.209
***
 5.128
***
 5.030
***
 
 (0.213) (0.260) (0.259) (0.306) (0.317) 
CF 0.044
***
 0.043
***
 0.044
***
 0.044
***
 0.048
***
 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
COUNTRY -0.826
***
 -1.752
***
 -0.820
***
 -0.568
*
 -1.138
***
 
 (0.377) (0.401) (0.249) (0.325) (0.064) 
FF -2.351
***
 -2.348
***
 -2.380
***
 -2.352
***
 -2.313
***
 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Q  COUNTRY 3.622
***
 2.100
***
 3.040
***
 1.991
***
 1.859
***
 
 (0.245) (0.285) (0.280) (0.328) (0.335) 
Q  FF -0.725
***
 -1.038
***
 -0.847
***
 -1.007
***
 -0.961
***
 
 (0.114) (0.156) (0.146) (0.185) (0.201) 
Q  FF  COUNTRY -1.693
***
 -1.319
***
 -1.495
***
 -1.306
***
 -1.232
***
 
 (0.132) (0.168) (0.156) (0.195) (0.210) 
Industry and year  
Fixed effects 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 239,907 239,907 239,907 239,907 239,907 
R-squared 0.163 0.168 0.164 0.164 0.166 
 
